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The evidence presented in chapter 7 indicates that there are sizable factor 
market imperfections in some of  the project countries. Knowledge that 
they are large, however, does in itself not tell us the effect these distor- 
tions have on labor coefficients and employment potential. 
The task of  this chapter is to analyze the influence of  trade regime 
(product market) interventions and domestic factor market distortions 
on labor coefficients. The objective, of  course, is to provide a rough 
estimate of  the order of  magnitude  of  the potential increase  in  the 
demand for labor, especially unskilled labor, that might  arise under 
altered trade Strategies and under altered factor market conditions. 
8.1  Within-Strategy Inefficiencies 
The labor coefficients  for exporting and import-competing HOS indus- 
tries  reported  in  chapters 5 and 6 reflect the outcome of  several in- 
fluences: the “natural” factor intensity underlying comparative advan- 
tage; the domestic factor market incentives discussed in chapter 7;  and 
the particular instruments chosen to promote the trade strategy in opera- 
tion in each country. 
Insofar as the trade strategy, through exchange rate overvaluation or 
other instruments, influences incentives to employ alternative techniques 
of  production, that influence is reflected in the estimates provided in 
chapter 7.  However, there is another route through which trade strategy 
influences labor coefficients: by  affecting the composition of  industries 
encouraged under a given regime. Empirically, the phenomenon is far 
In  revising this chapter, I benefited greatly from comments by members of the Workshop 
on  Economic Development at the Center for Research on Economic Development at the 
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more important under import substitution regimes than under export 
promotion:  the height  of  protection  accorded  to different industries 
under import substitution varies considerably, and it is at least a plausible 
hypothesis that alternative structures of effective protection might result 
in labor  coefficients associated with exporting and import-competing 
activities different from those reported in chapters 5 and 6. 
In this section, concern is with the degree to which observed coef- 
ficients by trade category may have been influenced by elements of  the 
protective structure. Two types of evidence are available: first, there are 
country  authors’ estimates  of  the  association between  the height  of 
protection (both for exporting and import-competing industries) and the 
inferences that can be drawn from the variation in  labor coefficients 
within trade categories as to the potential for greater labor utilization’ 
within trade strategies; second, there is the evidence from countries that 
did alter their trade strategies as to the effect on observed coefficients of 
the change. 
It should be noted first that there is a good basis for believing that any 
attempt to estimate the degree to which observed coefficients might be 
altered by improved resource allocation within existing trade regimes is 
likely to result in an underestimate of  the “true” potential. To some 
extent this is indicated by the experience of  countries that altered their 
trade strategies, discussed below. However, there are other reasons. To 
an unknown extent, choice and implementation of  trade strategy and 
factor market  distortions  may  interact to preclude the emergence of 
certain activities, and it is not possible to infer the potential of  those 
“missing’; activities. For example, Lipsey, Kravis, and Roldan’s (1982) 
results demonstrate that the choice of  location of  activities by multina- 
tional corporations is influenced by the real wage rate prevailing in the 
host country. To the extent that some countries with relatively abundant 
labor nonetheless established and enforced high legal minimum wage 
levels,  certain types  of  labor-intensive  activities may  not  have  been 
located in those countries, and instead developed elsewhere in the world, 
possibly even in countries with a higher capital/labor endowment but a 
lower real wage. 
Likewise, Henderson’s findings, discussed in more detail in section 
8.3.2, show relatively broad-based comparative  advantage  for South 
Korea and Taiwan, contrasted with relatively narrowly based compara- 
tive advantage for some of  the import substitution countries. What this 
suggests is  that  the coefficients and activities observed under import 
substitution may not at all reflect what would happen, either in import 
substitution  or  in  exporting  activities,  under  an  alteration  in  trade 
strategy and domestic factor market structure. Stated in another way, 
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substitution regime as a guideline to indicate where comparative advan- 
tage lies for industrial exports may vastly understate the potential for 
improved efficiency of resource allocation among exportables. It is quite 
possible that some potential exportable activities do not even exist under 
an import substitution strategy, and that some activities that do export do 
so only because their major raison d’Ctre is the incentives generated 
under an import substitution regime. 
Bearing in  mind  that  the estimates  of  within-regime inefficiencies 
probably understate the potential for gain through reallocation, we can 
turn to the evidence from the country studies. Focus is upon the potential 
effect upon average labor input coefficients for HOS exportables and 
import-competing industries that might have resulted under alternative 
incentives within existing trade strategies. 
8.1.1 
Data on the mean height of effective protection by the major categor- 
ies of tradables are given in table 8.1.*  As can be seen, not only was the 
level of protection different for import-competing and exportable activi- 
ties, but there were sometimes large differences in rates of protection for 
different types of  goods within the same category. For Indonesia, for 
example, the  average  level of  effective protection  for HOS import- 
competing goods was 66 percent, but it was 132 percent for those Pitt 
classified as protected, and -  14 percent for those deemed competitive. 
The data in table 8.1 are only the beginning of  the story. Within 
categories there was often wide variance, as was seen in chapter 3. For 
Chile, for example, Corbo and Meller calculated the range of  ERPs for 
each category of tradables. For HOS exportables, the range of ERPs for 
export sale was -  23 to + 14 percent; for HOS import-competing goods 
sold domestically, it was -  15 to + 1,830 percent. Carvalho and Haddad 
estimated ERPs for Brazil for a variety of years. Among manufacturing 
industries in 1958, during the Brazilian import substitution period, ERPs 
ranged from 17  percent for pharmaceuticals and 22 percent for machinery 
to 281 for plastics and 387 percent for food products. In Tunisia, HOS 
exports had  a mean rate of  effective protection  of  23 percent with a 
standard deviation of  44 percent, while HOS import-competing goods 
had a mean rate of protection of  300 percent and a standard deviation of 
772 percent (Nabli 1981, table 10.6).’ Uruguay’s range was also large: 
even at a two-digit level, ERPs for goods produced for the domestic 
market ranged from 20 percent for leather and leather products to 689 
percent for transport equipment and 1,014 percent for beverages, while 
for exports they  ranged  from 24  percent for leather products to 156 
percent for primary metal products (Bension and Caumont 1981, table 
11.7). 
Variance in Levels of  Protection Table 8.1  Effective Rates of Protection by  Trade Categories 
Country 
Exportables  Importables 
PCB-  Other  All  Protec-  Competi-  Total 
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Sources:  Argentina, Nogues 1980, table 2.3; all others, Krueger et al. 1981: Brazil, table 2.9; Chile, table 3.10; Colombia, table 4.4; Indonesia, table 5.11; 
Ivory Coast, table 6.10; South Korea, table 8.9; Thailand, table 9.9; Tunisia, table 10.6 (Blake’s estimates); Uruguay, table 11.7. 157  The Effect of Trade Strategies  and Domestic Factor Market Distortions 
8.1.2  Labor Coefficients by Level of  Protection 
A natural question therefore arises. Insofar as labor coefficients vary 
systematically  with the level of protection and there existed opportunities 
within trade strategy to alter the mix of  industries toward those with less 
protection, there presumably existed opportunities to increase interna- 
tional value added, employment, and real incomes for given levels of 
investment within the manufacturing sector by switching within a cate- 
gory to less-protected activities. 
There were three countries for which authors provided estimates of the 
labor coefficients in their countries by height of  pr~tection.~  The esti- 
mates are reproduced in table 8.2.  As can be seen, in these cases there did 
appear to be a relationship. In Chile, exportables with ERPs above the 
median had average labor coefficients below those of import-competing 
industries. Within import-competing industries, less-protected activities 
had a labor coefficient about one-fourth larger than did activities with 
above-median  levels of  protection.  For  Indonesia  the  same  pattern 
emerges for import-competing activities with below- and above-average 
levels of protection, although firms with average levels of protection had 
somewhat higher labor coefficients than firms with below average levels 
of  protection. For the Ivory Coast, exportables’ labor coefficients de- 
creased as effective protection increased; for import-competing goods, 
however, below-average protection implied somewhat lower labor coef- 
ficients. This reflects in part the fact that part of the Ivory Coast’s HOS 
import-competing industry is competing with other low-wage African 
countries. It is highly protected and, despite the labor coefficients, has a 
much higher capitaVlabor ratio than does production competing with 
imports from DCs. (See Monson 1981, pp. 266-67,  and section 8.1.3.6 
below.) 
For Tunisia, Nabli attempted to evaluate the relationship between 
labor coefficients  and ERPs by regression analysis. He computed a simple 
correlation coefficient between indicators of  factor intensity and ERP 
estimates, excluding those with negative ERPs and those with ERPs over 
400 percent. While there was no significant relationship for total labor 
inputs, there was evidence of  negative association between  unskilled 
labor intensity and the height of  ERPs (Nabli 1981, p. 484). Reasoning 
that the weakness of  the results might be  attributable to the scaling 
procedure used, Nabli then classified activities  into seven groups, accord- 
ing to their height of  effective protection, and computed average labor 
employed per unit of DVA for each group. Again, results were stronger 
for unskilled labor: the average unskilled labor coefficient for the two 
groups with the lowest average effective protection  (negative and less 
than 50 percent) was 37  percent greater than that for the two groups 
receiving the highest effective protection (Nabli 1981, pp. 460-61). 158  Chapter Eight 
Table 8.2  Labor Coefficients by Level of Protection 
(Labor Units per Unit of DVA) 
Indo-  Ivory 
Chile  nesia  Coastb 
Exportables with ERPs 
Below median or average  91.98  -  2,695 
Median or average  -  2,175  2,488 
Above median or average  44.39  -  2,160 
Import-competing industries 
with ERPs 
Below median or average  67.77  1,130  1,534 
Median or average  -  1,326”  1,652 
Above median or average  53.81  752  1,709 
Sources:  Krueger et al. 1981: Chile, table 3.17; Indonesia, table 5.19; Ivory Coast, table 
6.13. 
”This number refers to inputs with “medium”  levels of  protection. 
bNumbers are total man-hours (management, skilled, unskilled, and artisanal) per million 
FCFAs, HOS activities only. 
The same general pattern emerged in Thailand: Akrasanee regressed 
value added per employee (taken as a measure of capital intensity) on the 
rate of effective protection and found a significant positive association for 
direct, but not direct plus home goods, value added (Akrasanee 1981, p. 
429). 
8.1.3  Potential for Within-Strategy Gains 
Thus there does appear to be evidence of a link between labor intensity 
and the height of  effective protection within both exporting and import- 
competing industries among the countries covered. It remains to estimate 
how much potential there was for altering coefficients within strategy. 
This can best be done considering the evidence from each country in turn. 
8.1.3.1  Argentina 
Although there was considerable variation in ERPs and labor coef- 
ficients among import-competing industries, Nogues concluded that im- 
port substitution had proceeded so far in Argentina that there was little 
scope by the early 1970s for shifting activities within import-competing 
industries. On the export side, there was substantially greater potential, 
although the chief source of within-strategy variation appeared to be the 
labor intensity of exportables going to LAFTA, which was markedly less 
than that of  exportables destined for developed countries. In general, 
Argentine  HOS  exports  going  to LAFTA  originated  from  import- 
competing industries, and it did not appear that, given the strong protec- 
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proved resource allocation and greater employment within the existing 
trade strategy. 
8.1.3.2  Brazil 
Data for Brazil are too aggregated to provide meaningful evidence on 
the within-strategy variance in labor coefficients. What is available and 
suggestive of  the indiscriminate nature of  incentives under the import 
substitution strategy is a comparison of trade levels and labor coefficients 
in 1959 and 1968-74.  If  one takes either 1959 or 1970 labor coefficients 
and applies them to actual HOS trade flows over the years, the results are 
striking. They are presented in table 8.3. The first two columns give the 
estimated average labor input per million cruzeiros of actual exports and 
imports on the basis of  constant 1959 labor coefficients for each sector. 
The last two columns provide the same estimates based on 1970 labor 
coefficients. These data are based on the twenty-one-sector input-output 
table, and it is quite possible that further disaggregation might show 
somewhat  different  results.  Nonetheless,  the figures are instructive. 
Holding input coefficients constant, the changing composition of Brazil- 
ian exports over the period 1959-74  would have required a 70 percent 
increase in employment for the same value of  exports, based on 1959 
labor coefficients. Using 1970 coefficients, the estimate is even larger: 
about 83 percent. It will be recalled that the Brazilian government had 
begun altering trade strategies in  the mid-l960s,  and that the export 
boom began in 1968. 
The data seem to indicate that the industrial composition of the import- 
competing  industries  (as  reflected  in  the  actual  bundle  of  imports) 
changed little after the shift in trade strategies. The change in labor 
coefficients among exportables is sizable, and the estimated magnitude is 
Table 8.3  Brazilian Employment per Unit of Trade Implied by  the 
1959 and 1970 Labor Coefficients (1968 = 100) 
1959  1970 
Labor Coefficients  Labor Coefficients 










































Source:  Data are from Carvalho and Haddad 1978, appendix tables Al,  A5, A7, and A10. 160  Chapter Eight 
remarkably similar regardless of  whether 1959 or 1970 coefficients are 
used.  This probably reflected a more rational allocation of  resources 
among export industries, emanating from more uniform export incen- 
tives (as contrasted with the exporting from import substitution industries 
that had occurred earlier). With greater uniformity, there was a sizable 
increase in the labor intensity of  exportables. If  that interpretation is 
correct, it gives support to the suggestion offered above, that an observed 
difference at a point in time in labor-input coefficients between export- 
ables and the import competing goods under import substitution regimes 
understates the potential differen~e.~ 
8.1.3.3  Chile 
Chile is among the project countries whose trade regimes was biased 
toward import substitution throughout the period covered by Corbo and 
Meller.  Differences in  labor coefficients by  level of  protection  were 
reported in table 8.2, and we saw that exportables with above-average 
protection were less labor-using than import-competing industries with 
below-average protection,  thus attesting to the large variation within 
trade categories. 
Further evidence comes from data that Corbo and Meller provide on 
labor coefficients per DVA for individual four-digit industries. These 
cover only the eight largest HOS exportable industries and the ten largest 
HOS import-competing industries. Even among HOS exportables, most 
either were directed to other LDCs (see Corbo and Meller 1981, table 
3.12) or are related to resource availability, as with canning of  fruits and 
vegetables,  wine,  sawmills, and pulp  and paper. The range of  labor 
coefficients among the eight HOS exportable industries is from 21.5 
persons per million escudos of  direct value added (for malt liquor and 
materials) to 121.2 persons for sawmills. For import-competing indus- 
tries, the range is from 20.3 persons per direct DVA (motor vehicles) to 
71.5 for structural metal products and 83 for repair of aircraft and aircraft 
parts (which is almost always an industry in which domestic production 
within the category does not correspond to imports). 
The overlapping of these ranges is, of course, to be expected, and there 
is no strong suggestion of  selectivity within either exports or import- 
competing HOS industries. This impression is reinforced by the results 
Corbo and Meller obtained when they regressed net imports for indi- 
vidual commodity groups at the four-digit ISIC levels against unskilled 
labor and capital coefficients. Although signs were as expected and the 
coefficients significant for skilled labor  (positive) and unskilled labor 
(negative), the explanatory power of  these variables was not high: R2s 
ranged from  .33 to .39 (see Corbo and Meller 1981, table 3.18), thus 
further suggesting high variance in factor proportions among both export 
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8.1.3.4  Colombia 
Among the most convincing  pieces of evidence about the wide variance 
in  activities induced  by  an import substitution  regime was Thoumi’s 
careful examination of  the industries that changed trade categories in 
Colombia between 1970 and 1973. Recall that Colombia switched trade 
strategies in the late 1960s, removing much of  the bias for selling in the 
home market. There is reason to believe that in 1970  the pattern of output 
still largely reflected the earlier incentive structure and that, during the 
next several years, the composition of  output and trade was shifting in 
line with comparative advantage as the new incentives induced producers 
to alter their production patterns. Excluding food and tobacco, there 
were six industries that had been import-competing and became export- 
ing industries by 1973. The unweighted average labor coefficient for those 
six industries was 32.9. By contrast there were four industries that had 
been exporting in 1970 and were classified as import-competing by 1973. 
Their average labor coefficient was 11.3, although the number of indus- 
tries was smaller and the reliability of that coefficient is open to question. 
That examination of  the  1970 trade  pattern  shows some  import- 
competing industries with relatively high labor coefficients and others 
with very low  ones, relative to what occurred with a realignment of 
incentives, is strong evidence that the Colombian import substitution 
strategy  had  encouraged  import-competing  industries  without  great 
selectivity. This suggests that, if  it had been possible under import sub- 
stitution to channel more resources into those relatively more labor-using 
industries,  the  epployment  implications  of  the  import  substitution 
strategy would have been less unfavorable than they in fact were. That 
such a move would also have improved resource allocation is suggested 
by Thoumi’s examination of the effective protection rates associated with 
the industries that switched classifications: industries that became exports 
by 1973  had an effective protective rate of  11 percent (contrasted with 19 
percent for all manufacturing), while industries that turned from export- 
ing to import-competing had an average effective protective rate of  16 
percent. It would be of great interest to trace Colombia’s shifting pattern 
of  trade after  1973 as her realigned trade strategy continued  to pull 
resources  in  new  directions. And, though  the data do not  permit  a 
diagnosis of  the extent to which the export strategy induced a greater 
uniformity in input coefficients across sectors, they strongly indicate that 
the pattern of  trade induced under the import substitution regime had 
considerably greater variance in input coefficients than an alternate pat- 
tern might have had. 
One can infer the resulting shift in the ratio of  labor coefficients in 
exportable and import-competing industries from the following line of 
reasoning. Thoumi estimated that the number of  workers per million 
1970 pesos of  direct value added for all HOS exports rose from 23.8 in 162  Chapter Eight 
1970 to 29.1 in 1973, or 22 percent; if sugar, petrochemicals, and jewelry 
are excluded, the increase was from 28.6 to 35.5, or 24 percent. There is 
no indication of the corresponding change for import-competing goods. 
If  the shift was of  approximately the same order of  magnitude (toward 
greater capital intensity of import-competing activities  because the labor- 
using among them became exportable industries), there would have been 
a 25 percent increase in capital intensity in import-competing industries 
owing to their changing composition. The Brazilian evidence, however, 
suggests that the effect may be substantially smaller on the import side 
than  on the export side, and so  a figure of  10 percent  seems more 
plausible. Using that estimate, the implied capital intensity of  import- 
competing industries in 1970  would have been 14.00 (calculated by taking 
the 1973 ratio of  labor coefficients, 1.88, to infer a 1973 coefficient for 
import-competing industries of  15.39 and multiplying that by 0.9). This 
estimate implies a labor coefficient for exportable industries in  1970 
relative to that of  import-competing industries of  about 1.7, compared 
with 1.88 in 1973. 
One further point should be stressed. Not only did Colombia’s import 
substitution industries in 1970 consist of  a mix  of  labor-intensive and 
capital-intensive activities, but those few industries that were exporting 
encompassed a similar range of factor uses. Thus, while it is possible to 
conclude that import substitution more discriminately carried out might 
have resulted in both more output (valued at international prices) and a 
greater demand for labor, it also follows that the same sort of rationaliza- 
tion might have occurred among the HOS exporting industries, as is 
evidenced by the realignment of industries traced by Thoumi over the 
next several years. What is not clear from Thoumi’s data, or from other 
available evidence with regard to other countries, is the cause of  the 
indiscriminate pattern that appears among exporting industries. It may 
have resulted  from incentives within the trade regime or instead may 
have been a function of domestic policies that reduced the costs of using 
capital and thus made capital-intensive activities more profitable.  It 
seems  clear  that  both  influence-specially  currency  overvaluation 
associated with the trade regime itself and domestic policies making 
credit available at implicitly subsidized interest rates-played  a role. It is 
not, however, possible to evaluate their relative importance. 
8.1.3.5  Indonesia 
Pitt estimated that man-days per million rupiahs of DVA were 2,175 
for HOS exportables and 1,038  for HOS import-competing activities (Pitt 
1981, table 5.19). There was, however, sizable variance in labor coef- 
ficients according to the height of  protection (see table 8.2). Skill and 
capital utilization per man-day were also higher among highly protected 
industries: skill-days per man-day for the import substitution group with 
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the corresponding figure was 2.60. Energy expenditures per man-day 
showed a similar pattern: 72.43 rupiahs per man-day for import substitu- 
tion activities with below-average protection and 120.8 per man-day with 
above-average protection (contrasted with 20.5 in exportable industries). 
These data suggest that there was probably considerable scope for 
increasing value added (at international prices) and employment within 
the import substitution sector: if capital, as reflected in energy utilization, 
was the binding constraint upon the size of  the import substitution sector, 
employment could have increased about 66 percent within import sub- 
stitution industries if  resources had all flowed into the less-protected 
sectors. If, instead, skill availability was the constraint, the potential 
increase would have been even larger. To be sure, a shift of  resources 
toward exporting industries at the coefficients reported by Pitt could have 
generated an even larger increase in IVA and employment for the same 
capital or skill constraint. Nonetheless, it seems clear that there was 
scope for improved resource allocation within import substitution indus- 
tries in Indonesia, which might have permitted substantially more rapid 
growth of  employment within the urban sector than in fact occurred. 
There was not much variability among Indonesian HOS exportables, 
however. It thus appears that in the Indonesian case rational resource 
allocation within import substitution sectors might have reduced the 
differential in the labor coefficients between  exportable and import- 
competing industries. 
8.1.3.6  Zvory  Coast 
Labor coefficients for firms with above- and below-average protection 
were reported in table 8.2. As can be seen, there appears to be somewhat 
less divergence within exportables and import-competing industries than 
in other countries. Monson  concluded that this was  largely because 
whatever incentives there were-priority  firm status with the built-in bias 
toward capital-intensive techniques, low-interest loans, and the like- 
were provided to firms regardless of  their trade status. 
Monson uncovered one source of  considerable variance in factor pro- 
portions among import substitution industries: import substitution indus- 
tries competing with imports from other developing countries received 
higher protection than did imports competing with imports from de- 
veloped countries and used markedly different factor proportions. Prior- 
ity firms competing with imports from LDCs produced  89 percent of 
DVA in those activities and had a capitaYlabor ratio of 3,824 FCFA per 
man-hour contrasted with priority firms competing with imports from 
DCs, whose average capital/labor ratio was 1,522 (see Monson 1981, 
table 6.14). 
Monson noted that policies to encourage import substitution in indus- 
tries competing with LDC imports had really begun in the early 1970s, 
and that they therefore constituted a relatively small part of total domes- 164  Chapter Eight 
tic import substitution activities in 1972, the year covered in his study. 
Encouragement  of  industries competing with LDC imports within the 
import substitution sector would entail much higher costs, and reduced 
scope for additional employment, than would policies that tended to 
provide incentives for the relatively lower-cost import substitution activi- 
ties. Indeed, if the incremental capital stock were the binding constraint 
upon expansion of value added and employment in Ivorian manufactur- 
ing sectors, and if Monson’s estimates correctly reflect the disparity in the 
capitalAabor ratios between the two sets of import-competing industries, 
encouragement of import-competing activities with LDCs would permit 
only 40 percent the expansion of employment, and about 57 percent the 
increase in international value added (calculated on the basis of effective 
protective rates given in Monson’s table 6.13), that expansion activities 
competing with DC imports would provide. Although the size of  the 
activities competing with imports from LDCs was not large in 1972, there 
is reason to believe that it may have grown since, and that the losses in 
employment  (and  foregone IVA) resulting  from that policy  may  be 
sizable  .6 
8.1.3.7  Pakistan 
The Pakistani economy provides an excellent illustration of how com- 
plex the interactions between domestic and trade variables can be. Table 
8.4 presents data on labor coefficients within  individual industries in 
relation to the import substitution strategy. The first column gives the 
effective rates of protection prevailing in  1970-71.  The next three col- 
umns give the range of  labor coefficients, including the mean, high, and 
low coefficients found in firms within the industry. The final three col- 
umns give the average labor coefficients within the industries depending 
on size of  firm. 
As can be seen, the strongest pattern that emerges is that small-scale 
firms have higher labor utilization rates than large firms, though there is 
wide variability among categories. For example, large and small firms in 
the basic metals sector have almost identical coefficients, while medium- 
sized firms have a labor coefficient only about one-eighth that of  the 
other firms.’ That small firms in Pakistan are significantly more labor- 
using probably reflects in substantial part the existence of  the informal 
sector discussed in chapter 2. 
For purposes of  analyzing within-strategy inefficiencies, these data 
raise numerous troublesome questions. A trade strategy that encourages 
the expansion  of  small-scale  firms would  undoubtedly  have  a  larger 
positive influence on the demand for labor than a trade strategy that 
encouraged expansion of  large-scale firms in the same industry to create 
the same additional domestic value added. However, there is little hard 
evidence directly identifying the size of firms that would expand under Table 8.4  Variability in Labor Coefficients in Pakistan by Industry  Subgroups and Firm Size, 1969-70, and ERPs 
Man-Years per Million Rupees of DVA 
Range within  Labor Coefficient by 
Industry Subgroups  Size of  Establishment 
ERP  Med- 
Industry  197671  Mean  High  Low  Small  dium  Large 
Food and beverages  130%  62  91  29  127  57  54 
Cotton textiles  172  122  274  122  184  171  111 
Footwear  n.a.  113  244  85  307  236  91 
Paper and paper products  177  101  102  100  248  170  82 
Printing and publishing  36  124  271  110  198  131  109 
Leather and leather products  177  79  84  30  126  25  58 
Industrial chemicals  106  63  95  15  229  64  31 
Basic metals  220  119  240  117  124  17  126 
Metal products  235  207  538  115  296  157  205 
Electrical machinery  192  101  242  45  286  86  98 
Nonelectrical machinery  188%  222  473  189  279  208  209 
Rubber and rubber products  132  62  299  20  434  168  39 
Source:  Guisinger 1981, tables 7.9 and 7.11. 
Note:  ERP for food and beverages is that for edible oils. 166  Chapter Eight 
either strategy. Import substitution firms may on average be of larger size 
than exporting firms within a country. An offsetting factor, however, 
would  arise if  exports originated in  the larger firms within potential 
export industries.8 
Given the wide variation in labor coefficients within industries, it is 
difficult to estimate the degree to which within-strategy efficiency gains 
(as reflected by shifting resources toward industries with lower ERPs) 
might be realized in Pakistan.  There is not even a strong pattern of 
association between the height of  effective protection and the degree of 
labor utilization. 
8.1.3.8  South Korea 
As seen in chapter 3, South Korea’s pattern of  protection after 1960 
was based largely on a commodity’s trade status: the same industry was 
subject to different levels of protection depending on whether the prod- 
uct was destined for export or for sale in the domestic market. Thus, 
encouragement appears to have been based upon prospective export 
performance, which meant that incentives for exporting were relatively 
uniform for different industries. 
This incentive pattern appears to have resulted in improved efficiency 
of  resource allocation. This can be seen from Henderson’s results based 
on the Korean input-output tables for 1966, 1970, and 1973. The first 
year, 1966, was fairly early in South Korea’s transition to an export- 
oriented economy, whereas by 1973 the export orientation of  the econ- 
omy was well established. 
Henderson computed “g;’  coefficients for each activity, reflecting the 
degree to which international value added would be altered with expan- 
sion of the activity by one unit (a negative gj  therefore reflects the finding 
that the activity was, at the margin, uneconomic and that international 
value added would increase if  the activity contracted and the resources 
were reallocated elsewhere). A rough measure of  the efficiency of  re- 
source allocation can be taken to be the mean absolue value of the gjs.9 
Henderson’s results show that the developed countries had mean abso- 
lute gjs of about .  1 ,  whereas most of the developing countries included in 
his computations had gjs of more than .3.  South Korea was an exception. 
The figure for 1966 was already.  19, and by 1973 it had fallen still further, 
to .15. It is unfortunate that the comparable data are not available for 
Korea in the 1950s. If the efficiency of resource allocation under import 
substitution in that country was similar to that of  the LDCs for which 
Henderson did have data, and the mean gj  was more than .3  in the earlier 
period, it would suggest a substantial improvement in resource alloca- 
tion, within both exportable and import-competing industries, resulting 
from the alteration in trade strategy.’O 167  The Effect of  Trade Strategies  and Domestic Factor Market Distortions 
Table 8.5  Labor Coefficients for Manufacturing Indusfries 
within Trade Categories, Thailand 1973 
(Direct Labor Inputs per Million Baht of DVA) 
Trade Category  Lowest  Median  Highest 
Protected import-competing  4.9  21.6  89.3 
Competitive import-competing  5.3  41.9  118.2 
Noncompeting imports  10.7  34.9  61.8 
PCB-HOS exports  8.8  19.0  86.5 
Other HOS exports  14.4  32.2  80.2 
Source:  Akrasanee 1981, table 9.12. 
8.1.3.9  Thailand 
Thailand appears to have had above-average variation in input propor- 
tions within trade categories. Table 8.5 provides data on the labor input 
per million baht of  DVA according to trade categories, with industries 
recording the highest, lowest, and median labor inputs. As can be seen, 
the range within each category is enormous: the industry with the highest 
labor input had more than 22 times as high a coefficient as the lowest 
among protected import-competing industries, and for competitive im- 
port-competing industries  the spread was  almost as great.  For PCB 
exports, the range was from 8.8 to 86.5, and even for HOS exports it was 
from 14.4  to 80.2. Thus, in Thailand’s case, it appears that wide variation 
within sectors was at least as significant in affecting the growth of employ- 
ment opportunities as was any overall bias of  the regime. These differ- 
ences were also reflected in wide ranges of  effective protection rates 
within, as well as between, categories of tradables (see Akrasanee 1981, 
tables 9.8, 9.9, and 9.10).  Clearly there was  considerable scope for 
improving  resource  allocation  within  both  exportable  and  import- 
competing industries. 
8.1.3.10  Tunisia 
The indiscriminate nature of  import substitution in Tunisia prompted 
Nabli to estimate the order of  magnitude of potential gains in employ- 
ment and output, for the actual investment that took place, that might 
have been achieved under a more selective import substitution strategy. 
Nabli started by identifying relatively labor-intensive import substitution 
industries where imports were still entering the country. He then esti- 
mated the expansion in output that could have occurred at existing prices 
to replace imports and identified some capital-intensive industries that 
might have contracted. This would have released some capital, but the 
value of  output at domestic prices would have been unaltered while 
employment would have increased. He then investigated the scope for 168  Chapter Eight 
additional import substitution in industries identified as relatively labor 
intensive in the rest of the world but for which Tunisia had very low levels 
of production or had not started the industry, and he examined the scale 
on which they could have operated with the capital released from the 
capital-intensive import substitution industries. 
Nabli found that domestic value added in import-competing industries 
could have increased by  about 40 percent, while total employment in 
those industries could have been augmented by  51.5 percent. The in- 
crease in employment of unskilled labor would have been even greater- 
58 percent. 
8.1.3.11  Uruguay 
The Uruguayan system was characterized by  such detailed controls 
that wide variation was inevitable. This was reflected in a very wide range 
of ERPs for import-competing goods (import licenses were generally not 
issued for  goods that could be produced  domestically) and  also for 
exportables. ERPs for products sold on the home market exceeded 500 
percent for beverages, footwear, paper and paper products, rubber prod- 
ucts,  nonmetallic  mineral  products,  electrical  machinery,  transport 
equipment, and miscellaneous manufacturing. By  contrast, they were 
less than  100 percent for printing and publishing, leather and leather 
products, and nonelectrical machinery. For export, EERs exceeded 50 
percent for beverages, footwear, wood and cork products, rubber prod- 
ucts, primary metals, nonelectrical machinery, and miscellaneous manu- 
facturing. 
Such' large divergences in rates of  protection were reflected in wide 
variations in labor and capital coefficients. For export industries, the 
number of persons employed per million dollars of DVA ranged from 218 
(tires) to 1,615 (for wool spinning and weaving), averaging 366. Differ- 
ences in utilization of unskilled labor were even larger, ranging from 15 
persons per million dollars of  DVA in the tires sector to 472 in fish 
preserving. Similarly, electricity utilization per million dollars of  DVA 
ranged from 469 (fish preserving) to 5,498 for cement, averaging 1,483 
among the eleven largest HOS export industries. The range of  capital/ 
labor ratios (as reflected in electricity utilization per worker) was from 
0.55 thousand kilowatts per worker (in wool spinning and weaving) to 
26.06 thousand  kilowatts per  worker  in  cement production, with  an 
average of  4.06 for the eleven major exportable HOS industries. 
The range among Uruguayan import-competing industries was similar. 
Labor per million dollars of DVA ranged from 34 (tobacco products) to 
373 in metal products, averaging 238. Capital utilization ranged from 86 
in tobacco products to 5,150 in industrial chemicals, with a consequent 
range  of  thousands of  kilowatts used per worker from  1.20 in phar- 
maceuticals to 22.0 in industrial chemicals, with an average of  4.88." 
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import-competing production on average, there are two of  the ten ex- 
portable industries whose labor coefficients were below the average of 
the import-competing sectors, and one import-competing industry whose 
labor coefficient exceeded the average of  the exportable sectors. More- 
over, if  one sorts Uruguayan exportable industries by their destination 
(between DC and LDC), the difference in factor proportions is striking. 
Cement was  the largest  export to other LDCs  and had  the highest 
capital/labor ratio of  any of the twenty major industries enumerated by 
Bension  and  Caumont.  Wool  spinning and weaving was  the largest 
industry in terms of HOS exports to developed countries, and it had the 
lowest capital/labor ratio. Thus a switch of a million dollars of DVA from 
exporting to LDCs to DCs would have implied a reduction of 85 percent 
in electricity utilization, and an increase of  more than sixfold in employ- 
ment per million dollars of DVA. Within import-competing industries, 
the same divergences existed. Without data on the size of  the domestic 
market, it is impossible to ascertain the magnitude of  reallocation  of 
resource within import-competing sectors that would have been feasible 
within an export substitution strategy. 
8.2  Substitution Possibilities 
That the relative costs of  employing the services of  labor and capital 
diverged from their opportunity costs undoubtedly influenced choices of 
techniques and hence resulted in different labor coefficients than might 
have been ob3erved under regimes with no factor market imperfections. 
The magnitude by which relative factor costs may have differed from 
their shadow prices was estimated in chapter 7. Here the purpose is to 
employ those estimates to indicate the order of magnitude by which labor 
coefficients might have been greater under alternative incentives. 
For Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, country authors themselves esti- 
mated that extent to which factor market imperfections affected the 
choice of  technique. For those countries, the authors’ estimates  are 
reviewed first. For other countries where there is an indication of  the 
extent to which factor prices may have diverged from opportunity costs, 
the estimates of the magnitude of price differentials given in chapter 7 are 
employed, along with Behrman’s estimates of  the elasticity of  substitu- 
tion, to indicate the extent to which techniques might have altered in the 
absence of  factor market imperfections. 
8.2.1  Argentina 
Nogues  (1980) first considered  the effects of  removing distortions 
introduced by  interventions in the labor and financial markets, then 
estimated the effects of also eliminating the influence of the trade regime 
on the price of  capital goods. His results are presented in table 8.6. The 
first column gives his estimates of the percentage increase in labor coef- 170  Chapter Eight 
Table 8.6  Potential Effect of Removing Factor Market Distortions on 
LabormVA Ratios in Argentine Manufacturing Industries 
Percentage Increase in L/DVA Resulting from Removal of 
Distortions in Labor and Financial" Markets under 
Industry Category  Protection  Free Trade 
Exportables  25.1  18.9 
With DC  20.8  11.4 
With LDCs  23.0  12.1 
Other import-competing  23.0  4.1 
Total manufacturing  19.0  12.6 
Source:  Abridged from Nogues 1980, table 3.12. 
"Assuming: (1) loans granted for ten years; (2) repayable in equal annual installments; (3) 
real interest rate of  -9 percent and opportunity cost of  10 percent. 
Import-competing  18.5  10.0 
ficients that might result from removal of labor and financial distortions. 
As can be seen, for Argentine manufacturing production of  tradable 
goods, Nogues estimated that the labor input per unit of  value added 
might have increased 19 percent. He noted that removing these distor- 
tions would not have altered the ranking of industries by factor intensity. 
When Nogues assumed, in addition, that capital goods prices would be 
determined under free trade at an equilibrium exchange rate, the esti- 
mated total increase in labor utilization declines. This is because of  the 
high proportion of (highly protected) capital goods that are domestically 
supplied, so that, at free trade, the price of  capital goods would be 
relatively lower. Nonetheless,  the combined effect of  labor, financial, 
and trade market interventions has been to encourage the use of capital 
and discourage the use of  labor-intensive techniques, as is reflected in 
Nogues's estimate that manufacturing employment might have increased 
13 percent for the same composition of domestic value added, had firms 
maximized at  prices more closely reflecting opportunity costs of factors of 
production. To be sure, it is questionable whether the supply of labor to 
the Argentine manufacturing sector is sufficiently elastic so that a 13 
percent increase in demand for labor could be met without an increase in 
the real wage. The estimates serve to indicate, however, that the effect of 
factor market distortions may have been sizable. 
8.2.2  Brazil 
Carvalho and Haddad found that, even in the late 1960s, there was 
probably still a 30 percent differential between the relative cost of  em- 
ploying labor and capital in the organized sector and in the informal 
sector, which was not receiving BNDE loans or subject to social insur- 
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between sectors in severance pay provisions and other fringe benefits, or 
in minimum wage legislation,'2  it seems clear that even for the late 1960s 
they understated the amount by which incentives to employ capital were 
excessive at the height of the import substitution years. 
Carvalho and Haddad used estimates of  elasticities of  substitution 
provided by earlier work of Macedo (1974) and combined those estimates 
with plausible values of supply elasticities  for capital and labor to attempt 
to ascertain the effect on factor proportions. Table 8.7 summarizes their 
results. Column 1  gives the actual number of man-years of  employment 
associated with a million cruzeiros of production in 1970 for each major 
manufacturing sector. Columns 2 and 3 then give estimates of  the in- 
cremental employment per million cruzeiros that would have resulted if 
the social security taxes and the implicit subsidies to capital had been 
removed and if the elasticity of supply of labor had been infinite. In other 
words, the estimates of  the second and third columns correspond to the 
case where manufacturing industries could have employed all the addi- 
tional labor they demanded with no change in the wage (beyond that 
which would have arisen because of  the removal of  the social insurance 
charges). Column 4 then gives the total increments in man-years per 
million cruzeiros of output if  both distortions had been removed. For all 
manufacturing industries, the unweighted average increase in the labor 
coefficient would have been about 15 percent on these a~sumptions.'~ 
Carvalho and Haddad also provided estimates of what the effect would 
have been on employment if  the true elasticities  of the labor supply and of 
capital were,as indicated above columns 6 and 7. To be sure, a less than 
perfectly elastic labor supply would have resulted in an increase in the 
wage in response to the removal of capital subsidies and social insurance 
taxes. Even after allowing for those phenomena, the increase in manufac- 
turing employment in Brazil would have remained substantial: with an 
elasticity of the labor supply of unity, an elasticity of supply of capital of 
unity would have implied an increase in the average labor coefficient of 
about 8 percent, whereas an elasticity of capital supply of 2 would have 
implied an increase of about 6.4  percent. To  be sure, the magnitude of the 
effects varies across sectors: tobacco products is estimated to have an 
increased labor coefficient (in the case of perfectly elastic labor supply) of 
about 30 percent, while pharmaceuticals has a 25  percent increase in 
labor input per unit of  output. Rubber products, transport equipment, 
and metal products also show increases of  more than  18 percent. By 
contrast, textiles' labor coefficient rises by 11 percent, and several other 
sectors also have increments well below 15 percent. 
It should also be noted that a change in relative input prices would 
affect costs of  labor and capital-intensive industries somewhat differ- 
ently. If  the social insurance taxes were removed, the relative cost of 
producing the more labor-intensive goods would fall. That being the case, Table 8.7  Effect of Social Insurance Taxes on Employment in Brazil 
(Direct and Indirect Man-Years per Million 1970 Cruzeiros of Output) 
Increment with Elimination of 
Sector 
Actual  Social  Subsidies  Both  Total  Total with  Total with 
in 1970  Security  to Capital  (2) +  (3)  (1) +  (4)  EL =  EK= 1  EL =  1,€,=2 

















































































































































































Source: Carvalho and Haddad 1981, tables 2.20, 2.22.  Note: Figures may not sum to totals shown owing to rounding. 173  The Effect of Trade Strategies and Domestic Factor Market Distortions 
the competitive position of some of the labor-intensive items might have 
improved.  Thus  the  Carvalho-Haddad estimates  probably  represent 
something of  a lower bound of the effect that distortions must have had 
on manufacturing  employment, both  because of  the omissions noted 
above from the list of labor and capital market interventions, and because 
quantification of the average shift in labor coefficients fails to take into 
account the shifting composition of output that might result from realign- 
ment of  relative factor prices.I4 
8.2.3  Chile 
Corbo and Meller assessed the influence of the implicit subsidization of 
capital goods imports on the choice of  techniques within various indus- 
tries. Using their estimated production functions (see Corbo and Meller 
1982), they simulated what would have happened had the exchange rate 
been at its equilibrium level (i.e., the relative price of  tradable goods 
increased 30  percent with respect to home goods) and the favorable 
treatment of  capital goods imports had been eliminated (i.e., had the 
relative price of  capital goods imports contrasted with other tradables 
increased by  5 percent).” Their estimates are reproduced in table 8.8, 
based on the assumption that the commodity composition of trade would 
have been unaffected by the removal of  the distortion in the pricing of 
capital goods imports. Hence the reversal of factor proportions in Chile’s 
trade, discussed above, is assumed to persist. 
Corbo and Meller estimated that, both for exportable and for import- 
competing pcoducts (both to DCs and to LDCs), employment would 
have increased about 6-7  percent if the price of capital goods imports had 
increased about 36 percent. Capital coefficients in both exportable and 
import-competing industries would have fallen by about 30 percent.I6 
8.2.4  Simulation for Other Countries 
For other countries, the estimates from chapter 7 can be combined with 
Behrman’s estimates of the elasticity of  substitution to provide an esti- 
mate of the order of magnitude of the effect of factor market distortions 
on employment. It will be recalled that Behrman found that the elasticity 
of  substitution in most of  the industries for which he had data was very 
close to unity, and that a Cobb-Douglas formulation was a reasonable 
representation for most purposes (Behrman 1981, p. 186). 
It is possible to use that result to estimate the proportion by  which 
factor proportions might change. This can be seen as follows. The Cobb- 
Douglas production function is: 
(1)  Q =A  La Klpa, 
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Table 8.8  Corbo-Meller Estimates of  Effect of  Distortions on Factor 
Proportions (Direct-Plus-Home-Goods-Indirect Coefficients) 
Capital/  Skills/ 
Labor  Capital  Skills  Labor  Labor 
Exportables 
World  58.5  1,719  122  29.6  2.10 
DCs  98.6  1,830  84  18.6  .85 
LDCs  49.6  1,712  131  34.6  2.65 
World  62.9  1,348  133  21.4  2.10 
DCs  105.6  1,472  90  13.9  .86 
LDCs  53.5  1,321  142  24.7  2.65 
Import-Competing Products 
World  60.1  983  146  16.4  2.42 
DCs  60.0  910  148  15.2  2.46 
LDCs  60.7  1,339  134  22.0  2.21 
World  64.1  789  156  12.3  2.43 
DCs  64.0  73 1  158  11.4  2.47 





~~~  ~ 
Source:  Corbo and Meller 1981, tables 3.15 and 3.19. 
Note:  Skills are in “skill units” and are not dimensionally comparable to labor coefficients, 
which are in man-years. 
(2)  q = Akl-*, where q = QIL and k = KIL. 
Equation (2) can be solved for the capitalllabor ratio as: 
(3) 
1 
A-  Fa* 
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are 
(4) 
W  where  w=- 
R 
Let  w,  = a distortion-free wagelrental ratio and  w,, the actual wage1 
rental ratio, equal w,  (1 + d),  where d is the proportionate distortion. 
Combining equations (4)  and (3), and letting w,  = w, (1 + d), 
1-a  (5)  9d = c  (1 + d)  > 
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(6)  qs = cws1-y 
where qd is the observed (inverse) labor coefficient and qs is the one that 
would prevail in the absence of distortion. Combining equations (5) and 
(6)  7 
(7) 
9s 
-=  (l+d)l-cw. 
qd 
Estimates of the d's are available from table 7.1. All that is not known 
is the average labor share. Table 8.9 presents estimates of  the range of 
potential percentage increases in labor coefficients for plausible labor 
shares on the basis of  the equation (7).17 As can be seen, the more 
capital-intensive the industry, the greater the proportionate increase in 
the labor coefficient for a given distortion in the wagehental ratio con- 
fronting profit-maximizing firms under the assumptions indicated. 
Since the distortions listed in table 7.1 refer at least as much to import 
substitution as to exportable industries in the project  countries, the 
estimated increases in coefficients in table 8.9 provide estimates of the 
degree to which all (modern sector) tradable manufacturing industries, 
both exportable and import-competing, may have substituted away from 
labor and toward capital as a consequence of  distorted incentives. The 
estimates are indicative only of orders of magnitude involved. Nonethe- 
less, in countries such as Tunisia and Pakistan, with large rural popula- 
tions and rapid population growth, the estimates in table 8.9 suggest that 
switching  to more appropriate incentives within the manufacturing sector 
might enable a sizable increase in output and employment for a given rate 
of  investment, even within existing trade strategies.I8 
8.3  Relative Importance of Trade Strategy, Implementation, and 
Factor Market Distortions 
We are  now in a position to attempt to  estimate the combined potential 
effect of choice of trade strategy, within-strategy inefficiencies,  and factor 
market distortions on the increase of  demand for labor in the project 
Table 8.9  Estimated Increases in Labor Coefficients by Country 
Assuming Elimination of Factor Market Distortions 
Percentage Increase in Labor 
Coefficient If  Labor Share Is 
Estimated 
Country  d  .1  .2  .3  .5 
Ivory Coast  .38  33  29  25  11 
Pakistan  3.16  360  312  271  203 
South Korea  .ll  10  9  8  5 
Tunisia  .87  76  65  55  31 176  Chapter Eight 
countries. Such estimates are, of  course, based on a number of  assump- 
tions, not to mention imprecise data. They can best be interpreted as 
indicating possible orders of magnitude only. There are two bases for the 
estimates: data from the individual studies, and comparative analysis 
within a common model. 
8.3.1  Individual Country Estimates 
A first set of estimates is contained in table 8.lO.I9 There the observed 
labor coefficients in HOS exportables and import-competing industries 
(with the labor coefficient in import-competing industries set equal to 
100) are given in column 1. Columns 2 and 3 then indicate the percentage 
increase in the labor coefficient that might have been expected if  there 
were no domestic factor market interventions, and no incentives associ- 
ated with the trade strategy that lower the cost of using capital-intensive 
techniques of production (from the estimates in table 7.1). Column 4  then 
gives the best estimate of  the extent to which the labor coefficient might 
increase by  altering the commodity composition of  output under the 
trade strategy indicated.  Finally, Column 5 gives the coefficient that 
would be observed if  all sources of  distortion were removed. 
As can be seen, the estimated increments in  labor coefficients are 
sizable. For example, if  the underlying assumptions and data are correct, 
Tunisia might have generated more than twice as many employment 
opportunities as in fact were generated under the import substitution 
strategy. By and large, the estimates suggest that there is more scope for 
improving the efficiency of resource allocation among import-competing 
industries'than there is among HOS exportable industries. Only for Chile 
and Colombia do the estimates indicate opportunities for greater propor- 
tional potential increases in exportables. In both those instances this 
reflects the fact that exportables under the import substitution strategy in 
effect at the time of  the estimates probably constituted in part a response 
to import substitution incentives. In the Chilean case, especially, it was 
the incentives under import substitution to export to LAFTA out of 
import substitution output that  account for the sizable potential for 
increasing employment in exportables. This could have been realized 
simply by shifting toward greater emphasis on exports destined for de- 
veloped countries. 
Table 8.11 summarizes the findings from table 8.10 and in addition 
provides an estimate of the proportionate differences in labor coefficients 
under alternative trade strategies. For example, the estimates suggest 
that the Ivory Coast could have realized an increase in  employment 
within  HOS exportable industries of  25  percent,  and within import- 
competing industries of about 40 percent. In addition, shifting a thousand 
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able production (within the modern sector) would have permitted a 21 
percent increase in the demand for labor per unit of  shift. 
These numbers by no means indicate the extent or possibilities for a 
shift in the demand for labor. In particular, if  substitution of  labor for 
capital were encouraged by the dismantling of incentives for employing 
capital, there could presumably be additional investment in some trad- 
able activities; the increment in the demand for labor that might arise 
from that source is not considered here, partly because the estimates are 
already conjectural enough and partly because the same “released capi- 
tal”  effect  would  occur  regardless  of  which  of  the three  sources of 
increased demand for labor evaluated in table 8.11 in fact took place. For 
the latter reason, there is some basis for believing that the magnitude of 
the numbers in  table  8.11 already  reflects  the relative  potential  for 
increasing  the  demand  for  labor  by  working  within  existing  trade 
strategies and also by altering trade strategies. 
Comparisons across countries based on the data in table 8.11 should be 
made with care. In particular, the low estimated potential for South 
Korea is a misleading figure, given knowledge of the rapid expansion of 
manufacturing employment that occurred after that country’s switch in 
trade strategy. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the South Korean 
emphasis on export promotion resulted in a fairly efficient pattern of 
production within import-competing as well as exportable industries, 
which had  already been realigned by  1968. Thus, comparison of  the 
Brazilian potential for increasing the demand for labor through shifting 
trade strategies (which was presumably largely realized during the late 
1960s and early 1970s) with the South Korean potential is unwarranted. 
Of greater interest is the extent to which inferences can be drawn from 
the comparative magnitudes within countries. For Tunisia, the greatest 
potential source of increase in the demand for labor appears to arise from 
rationalization  of  the import-competing sectors of  the economy.  For 
Pakistan,  removing  incentives for  employing overly capital-intensive 
techniques appears to offer even greater promise of shifting the demand 
for  labor upward than does a shift in trade strategy. To be sure, Pakistan 
could, by shifting trade strategies and removing incentives to employ 
capital-intensive techniques, realize an even greater upward shift in the 
demand for labor. That is, if the laborhalue added ratio in Pakistani HOS 
exporting industries rose by 271 percent in response to the abandonment 
of capital-intensive techniques and Pakistan simultaneously shifted re- 
sources toward exportables, the scope for increased employment would 
be 1.41  times 1.71, or 3.82, since domestic factors of production allocated 
at the new factor proportions in exportables would result in a labor/value 
added ratio 2.41 times as high as the preexisting laborhalue added ratio 
in HOS import-competing industries. For all the countries except possi- Table 8.10  Sources of Potential Increase in Labor Coefficients 
Increase (Percentage) with 
Observed 
Direct  No Domestic  No Trade  No Within- 
Labor  Factor Market  Strategy  Strategy  Coeffi- 
Coefficient  Intervention  Distortion  Inefficiency  cient 
Potential 



















HOS Import-Competing Industries 
100  16 
100  15 
100  n.a. 
100  n.a. 
100  ma. 
100  25 
100  271 
100  8 













































HOS Exportable Industries 
130  25 
207  15 
80  n.a. 
170  ma. 
209  n.a. 
135  25 
142  27 1 
100  8 




























Sources:  Column 1  from  table 5.1; columns 2 and 3 derived from tables 7.1  and 8.9;  column 4 from section 8.1 of text. Argentine data are from Nogues 1980, 
table 3.12. 
Notes: 
Ivorian estimates are for modern sectors only. 
Corbo-Meller estimates for capital costs refer to direct plus home goods indirect (1981, table 8.8). 
An estimated labor share of  .3 was used from table 8.9. 
For Chile, within-strategy  inefficiency within exports taken to be LDC exports. 180  Chapter Eight 
Table 8.11  Potential Sources of Increased Demand for Labor 
(Percentage of Observed Labor Coefficient) 





Import-  in 
Country  Period  Exportable  Competing  Strategy 
Argentina  1973  19  10  30 
Brazil  1970  15  15  107 
Chile  196668  80  7  34 
Colombia  1970  24  10  91 
Indonesia  1971  n.a.  66  26 
Pakistan  1969-70  271  27 1  41 
South Korea  1968  8  8  0 
Tunisia  1972  55  143  23 
Ivory Coast  1972  25  40  21 
bly South Korea in 1968, there clearly was sizable room for increasing the 
demand for labor consistent with improved resource allocation, generally 
through more than one avenue. 
8.3.2  General Equilibrium Estimates 
A complementary means of  estimating the combined effect of  distor- 
tions avd trade strategies is to develop an optimizing model and employ 
properties of the solution to indicate the magnitude of divergences from 
optimality. Henderson did that for the project countries for which ade- 
quate data were available, as well as for some developed countries for 
comparative purposes.20  His analysis is set forth in Trade and Employ- 
ment in Developing Countries, vol. 2, Factor Supply and Substitution 
(Krueger 1982), and some results have been mentioned earlier. Here 
those features of  the model that are pertinent for interpreting his esti- 
mated costs of  trade strategies and distortion are discussed. 
Henderson's  model  is  a constrained  optimizing model2' subject  to 
linear and nonlinear constraints. For countries with input-output tables 
and tariff data available, the model maximizes international value added 
in tradable-goods production subject to constraints on home-goods pro- 
duction  (that it  equal base-period  domestic consumption levels plus 
intermediate uses as inputs to tradables) and on the total employment of 
labor and capital. In addition, there are constraints preventing output 
levels from  lying outside a  range  of  a specified percentage  of  their 
observed levels, 25 percent in the empirically implemented version. 
These output constraints are useful for a variety of  reasons.  They 
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They indicate feasible limits of  change within medium-term time hori- 
zons. Also, the shadow prices attaching to the capacity constraints can be 
interpreted as indicating the extent of  comparative advantage or dis- 
advantage in particular activies, given the pattern of  production.Z2 
For present  purposes, focus is upon  the magnitude  of  the cost of 
distortions. Of  the estimates emanating from Henderson’s model, two 
are especially useful and interesting in this regard. On one hand, he 
estimated the attainable increase in IVA that could result from realloca- 
tion  of  resources  (including factors of  production,  since substitution 
between capital and labor according to Cobb-Douglas production func- 
tions occurs in the model until the marginal rate of substitution is equated 
in all activities). This measure is an indicator of  the loss in real income 
associated with the combined influence of  the trade strategy and factor 
market distortions, although it has limited comparability across countries 
because of  differing degrees of  aggregation of  input-output tables and 
because the output constraints limited the feasible extent of reallocation 
of factors between industries. Owing to the 25 percent reallocation limits, 
the model might show two  countries  achieving approximately equal 
proportionate increases in IVA, whereas an unconstrained optimizing 
model might show one country nearing an optimum within approximately 
a 25 percent band of  output while another country might be shown to 
have much higher  reallocation,  with commensurately larger  gains in 
IVA.U Also note that the ouput limits constrain the size of  gains the 
model can generate. 
The othe; measure is the average shadow price attaching to the capac- 
ity constraints. This number represents an estimate of  the gain in IVA 
that might be had were those constraints relaxed. In that sense it provides 
some insight on the scope for gains from further reallocation beyond that 
permitted within the model. One should recall, however, that the prob- 
lem of differing degrees of aggregation remains and that, for both sets of 
estimates, observed input coefficients are taken as indicating sectoral 
coefficients (subject to substitution possibilities) that would exist under 
either trade strategy. In fact, one suspects that alteration of  the trade 
strategies may influence the coefficients themselves, as was reflected in 
the Brazilian and Colombian experience reported in section 8.1. It is also 
given credence by Henderson’s findings of relatively broadly based com- 
parative advantage across manufacturing industries for South Korea and 
Taiwan (and the developed countries) and much more narrowly confined 
areas of comparative advantage in the import substitution countries. 
The estimates are given in table 8.12. The first column gives the year to 
which  the data pertain, and the second column gives the number of 
sectors in the input-output table employed. The third column gives the 
average shadow price of the output constraints. This number represents 
an average, covering both sectors for which the shadow price is positive Table 8.12  Estimated Costs of Trade Strategy and Factor Market Distortions, 
Henderson’s Model (Percentage of Base-Period Values) 




Average Absolute  Increase in 
Value  Tradables 
Year  Sectors  Average  Positive  Negative  IVA  DVA 
Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Chile  1962 
Indonesia  1971 
Ivory Coast  1972 
South Korea  1966 
1970 
1973 
Tunisia  1972 









8.9  37.5 
-3.8  12.3 
14.2  31.5 
-  3.3  16.9 
-4.9  18.0 
.7  12.6 
-  1.6  24.3 









3.6  -4.9 
3.3  .1 
6.7  -  1.0 
3.9  .7 
4.2  1.0 
2.8  .4 
2.8  -1.4 
8.9  -  4.8 
Belgium  1965  62  2.3  16.3  8.9  3.0  1.7 
France  1965  62  6.9  20.8  7.3  2.7  .7 
Germany  1965  62  5.9  14.1  6.7  6.8  5.2 
Italy  1965  62  1.3  24.4  10.5  2.8  .4 
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and also those for which it is negative. Countries with a positive average 
shadow price associated with the output constraints generally show larger 
potential gains from expanding production for export than inefficiencies 
in import substitution sectors; countries with a negative shadow price are 
showing the opposite. This can be seen in more detail by examining the 
average absolute values of all positive-and  all negative-shadow prices, 
given in columns 4  and 5. These absolute values represent unweighted 
averages of the individual activity coefficients for those activities with the 
shadow price of the sign indicated. 
For example, for Uruguay, the unweighted average absolute attainable 
increase in international value added per unit of  relaxation of  capacity 
constraints across sectors with a positive shadow price was 9.7 percent. 
By contrast, the average gain by contracting import substitution sectors 
beyond the limits imposed by the model was 43.8 percent. For Uruguay, 
therefore, the costs of  inefficiency on the import substitution side seem 
sizable. Chile’s large average positive shadow price seems to reflect a 
comparative advantage in a variety of sectors that was underexploited in 
the import substitution regime. The Indonesian averages accord well with 
Pitt’s findings that the export side of  the economy seemed to be fairly 
efficient, but that there were sizable inefficiencies on the import substitu- 
tion side. 
The South Korean data are of  interest,  given that the number of 
sectors is standardized over  the three years used  and that the years 
covered are those during which the export promotion drive was in prog- 
ress. In 1966 and 1970, South Korea appears to have had a legacy of 
import substitution industries, the average inefficiency of which was still 
fairly substantial. This is reflected in the negative average shadow price 
attaching to capacity constraints, which suggests that the gain in interna- 
tional value added to South Korea from contracting import substitution 
industries beyond the capacity limits would have exceeded the gain from 
expanding her exporting sectors even more than the limits. By  1973, 
however, the model shows that those gains were largely realized: indeed, 
both positive and negative shadow prices averaged closer to zero, which 
is also reflected in the average potential gain in  IVA of  less than  1 
percent. 
Comparing the results for the four developed European countries with 
the results from the project countries is of interest. The Common Market 
was still in formation in 1965, and trade was expanding rapidly among the 
member countries. This is reflected in the European estimates, where the 
average shadow prices attaching to positive capacity constraints were 
fairly sizable, although still below those for Chile, the Ivory Coast, and 
Tunisia. What is striking, however, is that the absolute order of  magni- 
tude of potential further gains from contracting industries at their lower 
bound constraints was much less. Indeed, only for Italy did the estimate 184  Chapter Eight 
exceed 10 percent. This suggests that the efficiency of  overall resource 
allocation in the developed countries and, at least by  1973, in South 
Korea, substantially exceeded that in the import substitution sectors of 
the countries covered by the project. 
These findings are reinforced  by  the data in the sixth and seventh 
columns of table 8.12. There the estimated percentage increase in attain- 
able IVA, given domestic factor availability, is given in column 6, while 
column 7 indicates what would have happened to DVA in  tradable 
production at the model’s solution. For all the project countries except 
Indonesia and South Korea, the model estimated that maximizing IVA 
would entail a decrease in DVA. This suggests that the observed alloca- 
tion of resources in the project countries was in response to the incentives 
prevailing. For Chile, for example, the implied 3.6 percent increase in 
IVA in the model’s solution would be accompanied by  a 4.9 percent 
decrease in DVA, a clear indication that the resource shifts implied by the 
model were not profit-maximizing for producers under Chile’s incentive 
structure. 
By contrast, the positive shifts in DVA for South Korea and the four 
Western European countries suggest that inefficiencies implied by  the 
model’s solution were also reflected in domestic prices, and that those 
prices provided incentives for resource movements. This is especially 
pronounced in Germany, where much of the large estimated increase in 
attainable IVA originated in the inefficiency of the agricultural sector; at 
domestic prices, too, Germany’s comparative advantage in industry was 
reflected. 
For the countries covered by both the Henderson model and individual 
studies, the two sets of results reinforce each other. Regardless of proce- 
dures used, all the import substitution countries show large potential 
gains through increasing the efficiency of the import substitution strategy 
and resource allocati~n.~~  Some of them also indicate large potential gains 
through expanding some activities, primarily for export. There seems to 
be  little  doubt that the existing pattern  of  production, including in- 
efficiencies, has been the result of  the trade regime and of  incentives 
confronting domestic producers. 
By contrast, the degree of inefficiency in South Korea appears to have 
been smaller and to have diminished over the period covered by Hong 
and by Henderson. By 1973  it appears that the efficiency of South Korean 
resource allocation resembled that of the developed countries more than 
it did that of  the import substitution developing countries. 